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SI: Platforms and Cultural Productions
In the broader process theorized as the “platformization of 
cultural production,” the game industry has followed a dif-
ferent historical trajectory compared to either incumbent 
“platform independent” industries (e.g., journalism, film, 
and television), or emergent, digital-native modes of produc-
tion, such as live-streaming and podcasting (Nieborg & 
Poell, 2018). Since the launch of the first dedicated game 
consoles in the 1970s, digital games have been “platform 
dependent” as they are intrinsically tied to hardware devices 
that include dedicated consoles, handheld devices, and desk-
top computers. As such, they serve as a useful case study to 
explore the political economy of platform markets. Over the 
course of three decades, the game industry has demonstrated 
relentless economic growth and served as a beacon of tech-
nological innovation. Yet, while catering to hundreds of mil-
lions of players across continents, in an economic sense the 
game industry has never been truly a global affair (Kerr, 
2017). Demand for games is not evenly global with billions 
of players unable to afford expensive game hardware or soft-
ware, nor is supply, with a handful of regions being respon-
sible for the majority of game (software) development 
(Dyer-Witheford & De Peuter, 2009; Johns, 2006). While 
games may have global potential, production, and consump-
tion are unevenly distributed across countries and regions.
Platformization deeply impacts the game industry, which 
witnessed a significant shift in markets, governance frame-
works, and infrastructure similar to other segments of the 
cultural industries. Particularly, the broad diffusion of 
mobile media, largely powered by Google and Apple’s 
mobile operating systems, combined with the connective 
and advertising services provided by Facebook, led to a 
massive increase in demand. Partly spurred by the supposed 
“democratization” of game production tools (Foxman, 2019; 
Nicoll & Keogh, 2019), the supply of game software 
increased rapidly as well. In early 2019, the global market 
for mobile game apps is estimated to be over US$50 billion 
as half a billion smartphones are sold annually to users 
worldwide (Statista, 2019). This broader and more interna-
tional market raises the question of whether for-profit game 
production has become more geographically diverse as 
well. If the demand for mobile game apps is increasing, 
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diversifying, and becoming more international, does this 
mean that new industry entrants are able to upend industry 
incumbents? If so, what would be the political economic 
implications for the industry at large? One reason why game 
developers, regardless of their location, should be able to 
appeal to global audiences is because games can be designed 
to be relatively culturally agnostic, particularly compared to 
language-based cultural commodities such as news, litera-
ture, and television. Games convey meaning by engaging 
with rules that can be detached from cultural signifiers 
exclusive to the region where the game is developed; it 
would be hard to discern why the gameplay of mobile hits 
such as Fruit Ninja, Angry Birds, or Flappy Bird is distinc-
tively Australian, Finnish, or Vietnamese.
In this article, we are particularly interested in if and how 
internationally operating platforms impact national game 
industries. Do platforms and the app stores they operate pres-
ent a more level economic playing field for developers from 
a variety of regions? Or do they reify the unequal global dis-
tribution of capital? If the latter is true, this should concern 
all those who are concerned about economic sustainability 
and cultural diversity. The geographical diversity of “cre-
ators” in the “social media industries” (Cunningham & 
Craig, 2019), or the sizable investments by Netflix in local 
audiovisual productions (Lobato, 2019), may suggest that 
global flows of capital have reversed (from South-to-North 
and East-to-West to North-to-South and West-to-East), or at 
least simplified by shifting political hegemonies rather than 
specific imperialist nation-states (Suwandi, 2019). While 
YouTube and Netflix may indeed have a positive impact on 
local and regional industries that once had to fight much 
harder to compete against Hollywood, “transnational plat-
form companies tend to set global, rather than local, stan-
dards regarding content” (Nieborg & Poell, 2018, p. 4285). A 
centralized mode of platform governance is not only visible 
on Facebook and YouTube (Gorwa, 2019), but also in the 
very strict control over the distribution of mobile apps 
(Gillespie, 2018). Their supply is regulated by app stores, 
which have come to function as crucial “infrastructural plat-
form services” (Van Dijck et al., 2019). In this article, we 
focus on Apple’s iOS App Store, which together with 
Google’s Play Store, is one of the two dominant US-owned 
app store operators.1
To investigate if platformization leads to the geographical 
redistribution of capital and power in the game industry, we 
provide a financial analysis of game app-related revenue 
generated in the Canadian instance of the App Store.2 We 
wonder whether Canadian game developers—traditionally 
considered to be on the periphery of the traditional industrial 
“core” (i.e., Japan, the United States, France, and the United 
Kingdom)—are able to compete with industry incumbents in 
their own market. We focus on Canada as it has traditionally 
held a complex cultural and economic bond with the United 
States—the country that is economically dominant in both 
the platform economy and the game industry. This bond has 
been criticized extensively by Canadian political economists 
(Smythe, 1981). Canada’s geographic proximity to the 
United States resulted in decades of Canadian cultural policy 
as well as federal and provincial support aimed at mitigating 
the United States’ economic and cultural impact on Canadian 
industry and consumers (Edwardson, 2008; Tepperman, 
2017). A second reason to single out Canada is the size and 
rich history of its national game industry (Consalvo, 2013). 
In 2018, Canada directly employed over 21,000 workers, 
thereby, ranking second in employment (after the United 
States) in the West. Given these circumstances, one might 
expect Canadian-made game apps to dominate their own 
domestic market.
Before introducing the Canadian game industry and our 
methodological approach to app store analysis, we will first 
explore the broader economic context in which app stores 
are situated, followed by the introduction of two critical 
interventions from the field of critical political economy: 
“platform capitalism” (Srnicek, 2017) and “platform impe-
rialism” (Jin, 2015). These interventions suggest that plat-
forms augment imperialism and subvert national sovereignty. 
Building on this work, we suggest the notion of app imperi-
alism to highlight the role of app stores in both projects.
App Stores as Multisided Markets
Despite the ubiquity of app stores, scholarship on them has 
been slow to emerge in the fields of media and communica-
tion studies. For example, in an article reflective of studies 
on mobile media, Leyla Dogruel et al. (2015) observe that 
app research predominantly discusses app usage, reasons for 
usage, and privacy. If mobile app stores are mentioned, they 
are understood as generic marketplaces with uniform inter-
faces and pricing mechanisms. In this article, we complicate 
this perspective by considering how app stores function as 
infrastructural platform services. Here, we follow the recent 
work on app studies by Michael Dieter et al. (2019), who 
argue that “each app store comes with its own affordances, 
built-in logics, and mechanisms” (p. 3), each giving way to 
“distinct regional infrastructural arrangements” (p. 12). As 
such, app stores are situated in a complex ecosystem of mar-
kets, infrastructures, and governance models that the dispa-
rate fields of business studies, critical political economy of 
communications, and platform studies have begun to catalog 
(Nieborg & Poell, 2018). Before taking a critical political 
economic perspective on app stores, we first consider app 
stores as multi-sided markets.
Every day, several hundred new game applications are 
released through the App Store. Access to affordable game 
development tools has allowed for much smaller projects, 
more experimental game design, and, thus, a break with the 
historically blockbuster-driven segments of the game indus-
try (Foxman, 2019; Keogh, 2019). The proliferation of 
“indie” game studios, consisting of small teams who tend to 
self-publish original intellectual property (IP), can be seen as 
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evidence of developers’ ability to adapt to new business 
models, distribution platforms, and audiences (Parker & 
Jenson, 2017). As we will discuss more in-depth below, the 
Canadian game industry indeed underwent such a transfor-
mation, sporting a vibrant mix of indie studios and incum-
bent publishers (Consalvo, 2013). These are located in both 
traditional “media capitals”—Vancouver and Toronto—as 
well as emerging game development communities in 
Canada’s Atlantic provinces (Pottie-Sherman & Lynch, 
2019). At the same time, the accessibility of new markets and 
distribution platforms translates into increased competition. 
For game developers looking for sustainable revenue 
streams, app stores have become both a blessing and a curse 
as the app economy is highly stratified and, therefore, fraught 
with uncertainty. Despite billions of dollars in worldwide 
revenue, economic analysis shows that the distribution of 
app downloads, revenue, and ultimately profit, is highly 
uneven (Bresnahan et al., 2015).
Scholarship in business studies offers a starting point to 
account for the economic challenges faced by game app 
developers. This body of work, rooted in orthodox (main-
stream) economics and strategic management, is primarily 
concerned with questions pertaining to platform manage-
ment strategies, network economics, and pricing (McIntyre 
& Srinivasan, 2017). The main unit of analysis is the plat-
form operator, who facilitates transactions between two (or 
more) “sides” in a market, for example among end-users 
(i.e., players), app developers, advertisers, and other institu-
tional actors. Historically, Sony, Microsoft, and Nintendo 
operated prototypical “two-sided markets,” bringing together 
players and publishers (Rochet & Tirole, 2003). Platform 
operators largely settled on a fairly stable business model 
that was predicated on selling premium-priced titles. This 
market design incentivized platform operators to build a rel-
atively small, high-quality catalog of available titles. Though 
not without financial risks, this model has been quite lucra-
tive since the 1970s, both for the aforementioned trio of con-
sole manufacturers, as well as for several dozen transnational 
game publishers (Kerr, 2017). Then again, this business 
model had built-in limitations. On a global level, console 
gaming has been, and still is, only accessible to a small per-
centage of affluent consumers. This relative inaccessibility, 
in turn, did little to break down the “cultural bottlenecks” 
associated with the exclusionary communities of game 
enthusiasts surrounding console and PC gaming platforms 
(Keogh, 2019).
The advent of mobile app stores shattered this cultural 
and market equilibrium by upending the dominant position 
of game publishers in platform markets and affording new 
pricing models. As the operators of a de facto duopoly (in the 
West), Google and Apple automatically capture 30% of all 
app store related revenue. Contrary to dedicated game device 
manufacturers, for both platform operators the licensing fees 
from premium-priced software do not constitute their pri-
mary revenue stream. Apple’s revenue is primarily derived 
from premium-priced hardware, whereas the majority of 
Google’s income stems from advertising. Moreover, unlike 
dedicated game hardware, mobile devices are multi-purpose 
platforms with games rivaling for attention with connectivity 
or utility apps. This diversity instantly diminished the bar-
gaining power of individual game developers, who are now 
“just” one of the many tens of thousands of app developers.
Next to this positional shift, the App Store and Play Store 
deviated from decades of pricing orthodoxy by switching out 
the game industry’s dominant premium and subscription 
business models for the freemium model, in which payments 
are optional. For Google and Apple, there is an economic 
incentive to provide cheap, if not free apps to consumers. 
Around 2010, premium-priced game apps quickly coalesced 
around the US$0.99 price tag, after which premium pricing 
strategies were almost completely abandoned. Today, nearly 
all game apps have adopted the “freemium” or “free-to-play” 
business model, in which revenue is either derived from 
“in-app-purchases,” advertising, or a mix thereof (Nieborg, 
2015). The freemium business model favors economies of 
scale. Generating significant revenue necessitates the aggre-
gation of sizable numbers of players as the average advertis-
ing income per user is infinitesimally small and only a small 
minority of players tends to pay for in-app content.
Platform Capitalism and Imperialism
The competitive dynamics in platform markets presents a 
number of challenges for app developers, particularly new 
market entrants. As the dominant focus in business studies is 
the platform operator, the scale of these challenges for indi-
vidual game studios, let alone how geographical factors play 
into them, is largely unknown. Put differently, we lack insight 
into the particulars of economic sustainability or geographi-
cal diversity.
The above gaps and concerns feed broadly into the 
research program of the critical political economy of com-
munication, which provides a rich body of scholarship study-
ing and critiquing the concentration of corporate ownership 
(Mosco, 2009). Examples of this “institutional” perspective 
are analyses that consider the operation of integrated, trans-
national media and entertainment conglomerates, such as 
The Disney Company and Time Warner (Birkinbine et al., 
2016). Having an explicit empirical dimension, institutional 
studies draw on financial and corporate documentation to 
investigate corporate structures (integration, business divi-
sions), acquisitions, a company’s history, political profiles of 
key executives and board members, and worker-related labor 
issues (Corrigan, 2018; Mirrlees, 2013). The international 
impact of ongoing trend toward corporate consolidation, 
Dwayne Winseck (2008) argues, is hard to ignore: “Even 
some media economists who do not usually take a critical 
stance, see empire-building, finance and personal hubris as 
having become driving forces behind the consolidation of 
media markets, alongside traditional concerns with profits” 
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(p. 41). In platform markets, the dynamic of corporate con-
centration, inequity, and disproportionality—particularly, its 
democratic and political impact—have become even more 
urgent. Even among business scholars, there is broad consen-
sus that the combination of network effects, pricing strate-
gies, and high switching costs for users inevitably create 
“winner-take-all” economies (Barwise & Watkins, 2018). To 
critically engage with the political economy of platformiza-
tion, we build on the concepts of platform capitalism and 
platform imperialism to situate platforms within wider his-
torical, economic, and spatial trajectories.
Using a Marxian framework and being attentive to the 
aforementioned conceptual advancements in business stud-
ies, Nick Srnicek (2017) identifies the following four macro-
economic tendencies constituting “platform capitalism”: (1) 
the expansion of extraction (the intensification of data min-
ing, sold to advertisers, and data-intermediaries for-profit), 
(2) platform companies positioning themselves as gatekeep-
ers (gaining control over vital exchange points for capital 
and labor), (3) a convergence of markets (pointing to the 
infrastructural ambitions of platform companies), and (4) the 
enclosure of ecosystems (putting users into walled, fully 
controlled “gardens”). App stores are textbook examples of 
the capitalist tendencies outlined by Srnicek. Apple’s iOS 
operating system not only forces end-users to download apps 
through the App Store, it follows a clear lock-in strategy. By 
adopting this “walled garden” strategy, Apple prevents end-
users from taking their software (i.e., apps) from one app 
store to another. App developers, however, are given great 
leeway in collecting data from end-users, be it personal data 
or information from usage sessions. In the case of free-to-
play apps, data extraction is at the core of its business model 
(Nieborg, 2017). Most, if not all, freemium developers col-
lect, analyze, store, and share vast amounts of user data to 
“optimize” gameplay, or to increase player “engagement” 
and “retention” by building intricate data profiles. In terms 
of gatekeeping, Apple is particularly known for its strict app 
store policies, arbitrarily rejecting games deemed “contro-
versial” (Gillespie, 2018).
Taking on the question of the US dominance in platform 
markets, Canadian political economist, Jin (2015), places 
platform capitalism within a wider system of economic and 
cultural imperialism. His work is in dialog with, and updates, 
Lenin’s (1987) argument in Imperialism: The Highest Stage 
of Capitalism, wherein he argued that imperialism is inter-
twined with “monopoly capitalism,” driven by the unity of 
industrial and finance capital to export capital to new, 
expanding markets in the colonial and imperial periphery. 
During the Cold War, this theory was taken up in critical 
media studies and served as the jumping off point for a 
renewed focus on the dominance of the US-based cultural 
industries (Mosco, 2009; Schiller, 1991). Taking on criti-
cisms from within political economy and media studies that 
nation-states are no longer the prime driver of capital’s 
expansion, Jin argues that the nation state remains pivotal to 
the current geopolitical world order. Platforms, then, emerged 
as playing a decisive role in the global media, information 
and communication industries, as a “few Western countries, 
in particular the US, have dominated not only the develop-
ment of platform technologies but also the global penetration 
of these new technologies” (Jin, 2015, p. 16). Theorized by 
Greene and Joseph (2015) as a “digital spatial fix,” platform 
companies and the app stores they operate have become the 
key infrastructural projects exemplifying this long-standing 
imperialist dynamic, intensifying and expanding the reach of 
the US imperialism into digital spaces.
Cultural Policy Meets App Imperialism
Imperialism is as much about national sovereignty and unidi-
rectional flows of culture, as it is about how finance capital is 
able to appropriate capital from national economies to the 
ledgers of its investors. Political economic scholarship has 
been at the forefront of documenting the effects of the US 
imperialism on local and national cultural industries 
(Mirrlees, 2013, 2019; Schiller, 1991). For example, in the 
film industry, despite the purported globalization of culture 
after the end of the Cold War and the subsequent rise of the 
internet, the United States has continued to overwhelmingly 
dominate the flow of capital and culture (Crane, 2014). In the 
games industry, this dynamic has been visible as well, as 
development studios outside the United States, the United 
Kingdom, France, and Japan saw most of their revenues 
cross borders to global publishers based in said core coun-
tries (Dyer-Witheford & De Peuter, 2009; Johns, 2006).
Surveying the Canadian game app economy provides an 
opportunity to explore how platform monopolies impact 
national cultures of production. As argued by Aphra Kerr 
(2017), “While the digital games industry is extending its 
reach geographically, we need to empirically examine the 
degree to which it is a global industry” (p. 29). Despite obvi-
ous worries about the economic sustainability of app devel-
opment, little is known about the exact economic 
circumstances of national developer communities.
What, then, are Canada’s circumstances? On the one hand, 
Canada holds a privileged position. It is the United States’ 
largest trading partner, which resulted in a number of free-
trade deals: The North America Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA) and its purported successor, the Canada-United 
States-Mexico Agreement (CUSMA), primarily benefiting 
Canadian capitalists and investors. This “special” economic 
bond resulted in contradictions at the level of culture, leading 
the Canadian state to pursue policy interventions in the service 
of a perceived Canadian identity by way of protecting and 
encouraging Canadian cultural production (Parker & Jenson, 
2017; Tepperman, 2017). In the music industry, for example, 
the Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications 
Commission’s “MAPL” (Music, Artist, Performance, Lyrics) 
categorization defines the Canadianness of music along four 
very specific lines. As stipulated by the music (M) category, to 
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be entitled to protected airtime music is to be composed 
entirely by a Canadian citizen, permanent resident, or a person 
living in Canada for 6 months preceding a recording (Canadian 
Radio-Television and Telecommunications Commission, 
2009). While the MAPL system takes geography and citizen-
ship into account it ignores corporate ownership, leaving this 
approach ripe for abuse by national conglomerates and foreign 
investments.
This interventionist approach has since given way to a 
set of neoliberal policy prescriptions that emphasize 
domestic economic growth over sovereignty, leading, iron-
ically, to an increased dependency on foreign capital. More 
recently, Canada’s cultural policy has been aligned with 
the concept of the “creative industries” in which Canadian 
cultural production is to be oriented toward global market-
places such as platforms and app stores. In 2017, the 
Liberal government launched the “Creative Canada” pol-
icy framework, which leans on Canadian national identity 
to paper over market-driven, export-driven, and “cultural 
industrialist” policy prescriptions, rather than artistic pro-
duction in “market failure” activities (Davis & Zboralska, 
2019).
Research on individual sectors of the Canadian cultural 
industries highlight the tensions between federal policy 
interventions and individual firms trying to navigate plat-
form capitalism and imperialism. For example, Zboralska 
and Davis (2017) found that existing cultural policies are 
being “sidelined by a consumerist approach that gives free 
rein to streamed services” (p. 4). Meaning, whereas Canadian 
broadcasting is heavily regulated through initiatives includ-
ing the MAPL system, Netflix has been able to evade regula-
tory efforts such as targeted taxation, content quota, or 
discoverability requirements (Lobato, 2019).
The Canadian game industry occupies a similar position 
as Netflix in its ability to avoid direct regulation while ben-
efiting from a variety of cultural and industrial policy 
schemes, mostly in the form of tax subsidies and grants 
(Joseph, 2013; Parker & Jenson, 2017). In the United 
Kingdom and Canada, more so than indie outfits, large trans-
national game publishers have taken great advantage of vari-
ous tax relief schemes aimed at boosting regional employment 
(Pottie-Sherman & Lynch, 2019; Woodcock, 2019). Instead 
of highlighting cultural contributions, industry organizations 
tend to play into the “innovation perspective” pervasive in 
policy circles (Sotamaa et al., 2019), by highlighting the 
positive impact on GDP and games being an export product. 
According to the Entertainment Software Association of 
Canada (2017), the digital games industry added 40,600 jobs 
and a total of Can$3.7 billion to the Canadian economy. The 
same report also notes that 86% of employment is in foreign-
owned companies. As we argued elsewhere, foreign owner-
ship not only leads to a loss in tax revenue—revenues are 
either recycled as losses in-country or offshored as profits to 
parent companies—but also to more precarious work condi-
tions (Nieborg et al., 2019).
In what follows, we situate app imperialism in this spe-
cific Canadian context of the US dependency, ambivalence, 
and, at times, proactive policy intervention. App stores are, 
as of yet, fairly unregulated. Financial analysis by Bresnahan 
et al. (2015) shows that while Apple and Google’s app stores 
have dramatically lowered the costs of market entry, they do 
a very poor job matching “consumers to the overwhelming 
product offerings” (p. 241), subsequently raising the market-
ing costs for new entrants, favoring well-capitalized, estab-
lished firms as a result. While both platform operators could 
feasibly design their app stores to favor algorithmic recom-
mendations and curatorial practices promoting greater 
regional diversity, or content diversity in general, they have 
shown very little appetite or willingness to structurally tackle 
this issue.
Analyzing the App Economy
There is no question that digital game developers and pub-
lishers in Canada are successful in generating revenue, 
which we measure as the ability to derive income through 
the sale of apps or in-app content. There are almost 800 
active studios in prolific communities across the country, 
which compared to other countries, is high (Pottie-Sherman 
& Lynch, 2019). Economic activity, however, says little 
about potential imperialist effects on a domestic market. 
Instead, revenue generation serves as a starting point for a 
broader investigation that includes revenue capture, which 
we define as the ability of a parent firm to collect economic 
rents, either directly from a local or regional subsidiary 
through corporate ownership, or indirectly from a third 
party through licensing IP.
The Canadian game industry is largely made up of two 
kinds of studios: small independent (“indie”) producers and 
medium to large incumbents (Consalvo, 2013). These stu-
dios are arranged across the country in a “hub/margin” type 
fashion, with large studios cropping up in Montréal, Quebec 
City, Toronto, Vancouver, Edmonton, and more recently 
Winnipeg and Canada’s Atlantic region (Parker & Jenson, 
2017; Pottie-Sherman & Lynch, 2019). The larger studio 
clusters tend to create small agglomerations of indie studios 
around them (Joseph, 2013). These indie studios either create 
their own IP, competing internationally through the app 
stores, or take on contracts from larger publishers. Similar to 
other regional clusters across the globe, this setup has cre-
ated a dynamic where successful indie studios are acquired 
by larger studios looking to recruit a skilled workforce or 
incorporate new IP into their portfolio. In this environment, 
the Canadian industry has grown to rank among the top-five 
internationally, in terms of workforce and production output. 
Given these economic indicators, one would expect Canada 
to have a sizable financial footprint in the emerging global 
app economy. Yet, the industry has a long history of foreign 
dependency; incumbent publishers—the largest employers 
of Canadian game workers—are all principally owned by 
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firms based in the United States, Japan, and the European 
Union (Johns, 2006). Thus, while Canadian game developers 
are able to create significant revenue, it is very much the 
question whether they are able to capture this revenue.
To answer this question, we conducted a combination of 
financial and institutional analysis. Unlike their neoclassical 
colleagues, political economists tend to be rather implicit 
about their research methods (Corrigan, 2018). First, we 
address this gap by demonstrating how financial analysis can 
be used to explore the political economy of platformization. 
We acquired a unique longitudinal financial dataset, fur-
nished by the New York City-based market research com-
pany SuperData Research. It includes daily, title-level 
revenue (in US dollars) for game apps listed in the Canadian 
App Store from 2015–2017.3 A caveat here is that these rev-
enue figures concern direct revenue, or income generated by 
developers either through the sale of premium apps or 
through in-app purchases, such as extra content, virtual cur-
rency, or items. As such, we do not account for indirect app 
revenue, primarily generated through advertising. Because 
advertising income is paid directly to app developers (i.e., 
not routed through the app store), there is no equivalent title-
level dataset for advertising income. Therefore, while we 
state absolute revenue numbers in our analysis, these figures 
gesture toward broader trends. From this wide-ranging data-
set, we culled a snapshot, aggregating an annual top-100 for 
each of the 3 years. Pointing toward the high degree of skew 
in revenue distribution, out of the tens of thousands of game 
apps, the top-100 represents approximately 85% of total 
direct revenue.
Second, following political economic scholarship on 
corporate concentration, we engaged in institutional analy-
sis. Deviating from how Canadianness is defined by fed-
eral policy makers, such as in the MAPL system, we use 
three levels of corporate ownership to analyze if games are 
Canadian. First, the game has to be made in Canada, pri-
marily by a company located in Canada. Second, we fol-
low Jin (2015) by including IP in our analysis. Therefore, 
our second measure is if IP is primarily owned by a 
Canadian creator, publisher, or company. And third, the 
studio has to be primarily owned by a Canadian parent 
company, such as a game publisher. These three levels aim 
to reveal the current state of Canadian app development. 
Then, we used these three levels as a framework to quali-
tatively code our three annual top lists for app-level geo-
graphical diversity and ownership based on the following: 
(1) the “listed developer” or publisher in the Canadian App 
Store, its country of origin, and its number of released app 
titles; (2) the “actual developer,” its country and city of 
origin; (3) the parent-organization of the actual developer 
and its country of origin; and (4) the game title’s release 
date. We included the actual developer category as there 
tends to be a discrepancy between studios as they appear in 
the App Store listing (i.e., on a game’s profile) and the stu-
dio that veritably developed said title.
Throughout the coding of our dataset, we followed 
Corrigan’s (2018) suggestion to “burrow down” (p. 2757) 
into our empirical material. That is, to verify the information 
offered in the four categories outlined earlier, company 
information was gleaned from Canadian App Store pages, 
developer and publisher websites, social media, LinkedIn, 
news sources, and government company registries. Unique 
Identifiers, a unique numeric string assigned to individual 
titles by Apple, allowed us to verify accuracy from year to 
year, as well as to track acquisitions, which can then be used 
to reveal economic and financial shifts across the game app 
economy. By using Unique Identifiers, we leveraged the 
“research affordances” native to the App Store (Dieter et al., 
2019), which provides a much higher level of data transpar-
ency compared to the relatively closed environments of dedi-
cated game consoles.
America First! Canada Last?
Reviewing the annual lists of top-performing apps, there are 
two economic trends that become immediately apparent: 
growth and entrenchment. From 2015–2017, the top-100 of 
game apps ranked in approximately, US$140, US$156, and 
US$166 million in revenue. This growth pattern coincides 
with the long-term staying power of a handful of titles. 
Notably, studios (and their subsidiaries), such as Supercell, 
King Mobile, Playtika, and Machine Zone dominate the 
annual top-10 lists (see Table 1). Electronic Arts, founded in 
1982, is the only studio in the top-10 with incumbent roots. 
Launched in 2015, Star Wars: Galaxy of Heroes entered the 
top-10 in 2017, using the well-known Star Wars IP owned by 
The Walt Disney Company.
If anything, the top-ranked titles show remarkable persis-
tence considering that games such as Clash of Clans and 
Candy Crush Saga were launched in 2012. One of the reasons 
for the continued success of this group of killer apps could be 
the blockbuster dynamic that has been a hallmark of game 
publishing for decades. Mobile hits are similar to long-run-
ning game franchises, such as World of Warcraft and Call of 
Duty, as they are examples of heavily advertised, multiplayer 
games that leverage direct network effects (i.e., players who 
want to play with others). In addition, once a game achieves 
“hit” status, the App Store’s online ranking systems provide a 
positive feedback loop ensuring continued exposure to poten-
tial new players through the App Store’s top lists.
As we move down the list of top-100 developers, there is a 
continual familiarity in studio and title names with only a 
combined 27 studios new to the 2016 and 2017 top-100 lists. 
The lists show that despite the broader industry trend allow-
ing for “informal videogame development practices” (Keogh, 
2019), incorporated studios engaging in formalized modes of 
production reign supreme. The majority of titles represents 
either new games by subsidiary studios, such as Machine 
Zone’s Mobile Strike developed by its Epic War division, or 
games published by legacy game companies breaking into the 
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mobile industry with pre-existing IPs, for example Nintendo’s 
Super Mario Run entering as number 49 in 2016. We also see 
consistent growth by established studios releasing new titles 
that occasionally skyrocket into the top-10, such as Supercell’s 
Clash Royale in 2016. We would argue that the initial suc-
cesses of an early wave of newcomers, such as Supercell 
founded in 2010, obscure how difficult it became to break 
into the top-100 by 2015. In less than a decade, the app econ-
omy has become an entrenched market dominated by estab-
lished IPs, studios, and publishers.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, app store incumbency translates 
into geographical dominance, particularly by Silicon Valley-
based companies (see Table 2). In 2015, 49 titles were created 
by the US developers, with 36 of those in California and 25 
located across the Silicon Valley Region. However, as we move 
into 2016 and 2017, there is a continued drop in the US-based 
development. There are a few incumbent studios, notably ones 
based in Russia, which emerged with 3 and 5 titles in 2016 and 
2017, respectively. Revenue generated by studios in China, 
Finland, Japan, and the United Kingdom increased by 10 titles 
in 2016, followed by another 4 in 2017. These collective suc-
cesses can be seen as further proof that games designed to be 
culturally agnostic and emerging from smaller countries, such 
as Finland and Israel, can distribute far beyond their respective 
domestic markets. Despite the decrease in the US titles, reve-
nue generation increased from 2015–2017, suggesting that the 
US market dominance is entrenched but not guaranteed. 
Throughout these years, Canada’s footprint in its own App 
Store is paltry, demonstrating a steady level of decline.
The US revenue generation may have stalled somewhat, 
though this is offset by maintaining high levels of revenue cap-
ture, either through acquisitions of non-US developer studios 
or of IPs. From 2015–2017, the United States consistently 
captured around 44%, 52%, and 45%, respectively, of total 
direct revenue in the top-100 titles (see Table 3). In particular, 
the February 2016 acquisition of King—known for the Candy 
Crush franchise—by the California-based game publisher 
Activision Blizzard, translated into a sharp increase in the US 
revenue capture. Lacking significant revenue generation or the 
presence of incumbent publishers, Canada’s ability to capture 
revenue decreased to 0.1% in 2017.
Table 1. Top-10 publishers by year in the Canadian App Store.
2015 2016 2017
Rank Title Developer Title Developer Title Developer
1 Clash of Clans Supercell Mobile Strike Machine Zone Clash Royale Supercell
2 Game of War Machine Zone Game of War Machine Zone Candy Crush Saga King Mobile
3 Boom Beach Supercell Clash Royale Supercell Clash of Clans Supercell
4 Candy Crush Saga King Mobile Clash of Clans Supercell Game of War Machine Zone
5 Candy Crush Soda Saga King Mobile Candy Crush Saga King Mobile Pokémon GO Niantic
6 Slotomania Casino Playtika Pokémon GO Niantic Mobile Strike Machine Zone
7 Hay Day Supercell Slotomania Casino Playtika Slotomania Casino Playtika
8 Marvel Contest of 
Champions
Kabam Marvel Contest of 
Champions
Kabam Lords Mobile IGG
9 Big Fish Casino Big Fish Candy Crush Soda Saga King Mobile Candy Crush Soda Saga King Mobile
10 DoubleDown Casino DoubleDown Boom Beach Supercell Star Wars: Galaxy of 
Heroes
Electronic Arts
Table 2. Revenue generation by nation-states by year in the App 
Store top-100.
2015 2016 2017
Country Titles Revenue Titles Revenue Titles Revenue
The United States 49 US$50.3 43 US$68.9 35 US$59.7
Finland 4 US$35.3 7 US$34.2 7 US$30.8
The United 
Kingdom
5 US$10.2 6 US$9 8 US$12.1
Japan 4 US$1.2 6 US$2.8 8 US$9.8
Israel 5 US$8.1 5 US$10.5 5 US$9.5
China 3 US$3.6 7 US$6.1 7 US$7.6
Russia 0 US$0 3 US$0.9 5 US$3.7
South Korea 2 US$3.2 2 US$3.6 3 US$3.2
Canada 3 US$5.6 3 US$1.8 3 US$0.9
Australia 2 US$1.2 1 US$0.9 1 US$0.5
Table 3. Revenue capture by nation-states by year in the App 
Store top-100.
2015 2016 2017
Country % Revenue % Revenue % Revenue
United States 44 US$62.3 52 US$81.7 45 US$73.9
China 4 US$6.1 35 US$54.3 34 US$57
Japan 27 US$37.3 3 US$3.9 6 US$9.9
South Korea 2 US$3.2 2 US$3.6 4 US$6.2
Russia 0 US$0 0.5 US$0.9 2 US$3.7
Australia 0.2 US$0.4 0.3 US$0.6 2 US$3.7
United Kingdom 14 US$20.5 0 US$0 1 US$2.4
Finland 0 US$0 0.3 US$0.6 0.2 US$0.4
Canada 0.8 US$1.2 0.3 US$0.5 0.1 US$0.3
Israel 0.2 US$0.3 1 US$1.8 0 US$0
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Comparing revenue creation and capture in Tables 2 and 3, 
two countries stand out: Finland and China. The former’s 
financial success in the mobile segment is remarkable for a 
small country of 5.5 million. Finland is similar to Canada in 
the sense that both have a vibrant game industry—employing 
thousands—and interventionist cultural policies. As the rev-
enue figures in Table 2 make clear, both countries differ when 
it comes to revenue generation, with the Fins coming in sec-
ond after the United States and Canada falling far behind. 
This could be explained by the differences in cultural policy 
as Finnish state-funding bodies have shown a “willingness to 
support domestic companies on the global market” (Sotamaa 
et al., 2019, p. 11), instead of only offering tax breaks to trans-
national incumbents. Then again, Table 3 also shows the per-
sistent lack of revenue captured by Finnish studios and the 
inability, or unwillingness, of policy makers to resist the lure 
of foreign capital.
This brings us to one of the biggest sources of foreign cap-
ital, China, which seemingly out of the blue has become a 
dominant global actor in game apps. From 2015–2017, China 
went from a respectable fourth place in revenue capture to a 
dominant second place, tight on the heels of the United States. 
The main cause for this transition is a number of strategic 
acquisitions of studios and publishers based in Japan, Finland, 
and Israel, primarily by Tencent Holdings. One of Tencent’s 
most notable acquisitions was the 2016 purchase of the 
Finnish studio Supercell, which allowed Tencent to switch 
places with the Japan-based conglomerate SoftBank (see 
Table 4). As argued by Cheung and Fung (2016), after 
benefiting from decades of protectionist measures, Chinese 
media and game companies started leveraging finance capital 
as a potent instrument to rapidly gain a dominant share in the 
global market for online games. Interestingly, whereas US 
companies acquired or invested in Canadian companies, 
Chinese companies also obtained studios in emerging game 
industries, such as Finland and Israel. Tencent’s global expan-
sion is part of a much broader trend of Chinese platformiza-
tion, which is as much driven by massive Chinese platform 
companies as by the State and international finance capital 
(Jia & Winseck, 2018). All this is to suggest that China is fol-
lowing in the footsteps of the United States as a newly emerg-
ing game empire, but very much on its own terms.
As is becoming increasingly clear, despite the economic 
opportunities in the Canadian App Store, Canadian owned 
and developed studios are plagued by obscurity (see Table 5). 
From 2015–2017, we found only 5 Canadian studios in our 
top lists. Of these five, Blight Games and Blammo Games are 
owned by the US publishers Electronic Arts and Glu Mobile, 
whereas only three studios (Ludia, LDRLY, and East Side 
Games) are independently owned. When analyzing this 
Canadian quintet, Blight, Blammo, and Ludia worked with 
the US licensed IP, such as The Simpsons, Kim Kardashian, 
and Jurassic Park. East Side Games worked with the 
Canadian licensed IP Trailer Park Boys. The only developer 
to produce its own IP is LRDLY with its Bud Farms series, a 
game that centers on growing and smoking marijuana, a 
theme that entered the national conversation during the debate 
to legalize cannabis in 2015.
Table 4. Top-10 revenue capture by parent-organizations.
2015 2016 2017
Rank Revenue Parent Revenue Parent Revenue Parent
1 US$33.5 SoftBank Group US$34.3 Tencent US$31.6 Tencent
2 US$20.4 King Mobile US$27.9 Machine Zone US$21 Machine Zone
3 US$14 Machine Zone US$17.6 Activision Blizzard US$20.6 Activision Blizzard
4 US$9.3 Caesars Entertainment US$8.5 Chinese Consortium US$10 Chinese Consortium
5 US$7.3 Electronic Arts US$8.1 Electronic Arts US$9.3 Niantic
6 US$5.6 Kabam US$6.7 Niantic US$6.4 Electronic Arts
7 US$5.1 Churchill Downs US$5 Gaea Mobile US$5.2 IGG
8 US$3.7 IGT US$3.6 IGT US$4.3 Nintendo
9 US$2.9 Tencent US$3.5 Churchill Downs US$3.7 Aristocrat Leisure
10 US$2.8 Gamevil US$3.3 Gamevil US$3.5 DoubleUGAMES
Table 5. Canadian titles in the top-100 (2015–2017).
Title Developer Parent Country IP
The Simpsons: Tapped Out Blight Games Electronic Arts The United States The United States
Kim Kardashian: Hollywood Blammo Games Glu Mobile The United States The United States
Jurassic World: The Game Ludia Ludia Canada The United States
Trailer Park Boys: Greasy Money East Side Games East Side Games Canada Canada
Bud Farm: Grass Roots LDRLY LDRLY Canada Canada
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Conclusion
By quite literally following the money, we questioned whether 
or not the political economy of game apps is an artifact of plat-
form markets, industry dynamics, or both. In our financial and 
institutional analysis of the Canadian App Store, we observe 
three broader economic trends that suggest that the answer is 
“both.” First, app store incumbency (measured as studios hav-
ing titles consistently ranked in the top-100) is a key factor 
determining an app’s ability to generate long-term revenue. 
The select group of studios with hits either in the App Store’s 
early years (2008–2010) or during the subsequent switch from 
the premium to the freemium business model (2010–2012) 
has had remarkable staying power. Second, incumbency has a 
strong correlation with the geographical dominance, particu-
larly of the United States, both in terms of revenue generation 
and capture. Third, acquiring successful studios has been the 
quickest route to revenue capture. This not only becomes clear 
when observing how US development declined and revenue 
capture increased from 2016–2017, but also considering the 
meteoric growth of Chinese corporate ownership in the same 
period. We suggest future research to further investigate 
whether Chinese conglomerates challenge or propel platform 
capitalism and imperialism.
Our financial and institutional analysis helps us answer the 
straight-forward question that prompted our research: Are 
there Canadian apps in the Canadian app stores? The short 
answer is, of course, there are plenty. Canada has a vibrant 
game development ecosystem populated by a broad variety of 
developers, ranging from hobbyists, students and artists, to the 
hundreds of well-paid developers employed by large game 
studios in Vancouver, Toronto, and Montréal. This explosion 
of ludic creativity is not unique to Canada. Across the globe, 
developers in countries that have historically been at the 
periphery of the game industry (e.g., Australia, Israel, and 
China), leveraged the low barriers to market entry to gain a 
foothold in the app economy. Canada, however, not so much. 
The Canadian game industry remains an outsourcing hub and 
functions as a “net-exporter,” with studios making most, if not 
all of their revenue from foreign sales of content under the 
aegis of transnational publishers (Consalvo, 2013).
For those well-versed in the political economy of commu-
nications, the results of our study will come hardly as a sur-
prise. Why would the app economy be an exception to the 
cultural industry’s blockbuster dynamic? As argued by Kerr 
(2017), even if “the barriers to entry have come down, the 
risks and hit-based nature of the business has not changed” (p. 
176). The Canadian game industry mimics patterns of owner-
ship observed in, for example, its film industry. While 
Vancouver and Toronto are important film production hubs, 
in 2009 Canadian-made movies counted zero top-10 hits and 
claimed only a 3.3% national market share (Crane, 2014). We 
should also note that Canadian developers and consumers 
have not resisted, but rather embraced the dominant role of 
US imports in the Canadian media landscape. Netflix, for 
example, has been widely adopted by Canadian consumers. 
Canadian indie game developers, for their part, often consider 
themselves members of particular local and global communi-
ties simultaneously, rather than feeling any sense of national 
identity (Parker & Jenson, 2017).
The results of our analysis point to the relevance of two 
debates: the effectiveness of cultural policy against the back-
ground of platform and app imperialism, and how to study the 
political economy of platformization. While Canadian policy 
makers have been notably proactive in supporting Canadian-
made cultural content (Tepperman, 2017), our findings ques-
tion the impact of such policies in an ecosystem dominated by 
the US multinationals. Being so closely aligned to the United 
States, Canada’s position in this dynamic is itself contradic-
tory. Canada is home to a range of institutions and industries 
that capture revenue far beyond its borders (Kellogg, 2015). 
Canada’s cultural industries, however, are a favored destina-
tion for the United States and European investments, support-
ing Jin’s (2015) thesis that the United States is able to exploit 
its unique position in the platform economy. We do not mean 
to suggest, however, that the solution to Canada’s challenges 
with app imperialism is to become better at imperialism itself. 
For one, it seems unlikely that Canada will be able to mount 
a serious challenge to US hegemony (Mirrlees, 2013), but 
more importantly, imperialism is in itself an antidemocratic 
project. If Canada were to prioritize Canadian ownership, it 
would only be meaningful for the majority of Canadians if 
this ownership had democratic input. Otherwise, it is likely 
that Canadian ownership will only result in national oligopo-
lies such as the dreadful trio of Bell, Telus, and Rogers that 
control the Canadian telecommunications sector. A more 
effective challenge to platform imperialism would be coun-
tered democratically, rather than technocratically.
What, then, does app imperialism tell us about the plat-
formization of cultural production? Leveraging the research 
affordances of Apple’s iOS platform, our mix of quantitative 
financial analysis and qualitative institutional analysis yields 
insight into broader economic trends in platform markets. 
While our analysis yields a bounded temporal, financial, and 
regional snapshot, it does also gesture toward broader critical 
material issues that suggest that platformization marks an 
intensification of corporate concentration, the commodifica-
tion of cultural content, and the unidirectional flow of global 
capital. Ultimately, these insights are meant as a first step 
toward a broader empirical inquiry into questions concerning 
economic sustainability and cultural diversity.
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Notes
1. When App Store is capitalized, we refer specifically to Apple’s 
iOS marketplace for apps.
2. Apple’s iOS App Store caters to 5 regions, hosting 128 indi-
vidual app storefronts, each of which are localized in terms 
of payment options and language, offering regional/national 
languages, English, or both.
3. SuperData Research collects revenue information directly 
from payment providers, such as credit card companies and 
payment intermediaries. Since these financial numbers do not 
account for a full 100% of all direct revenue, the company uses 
statistical modeling to increase their accuracy to a level that is 
acceptable to its clients (financial institutions, media compa-
nies, etc.).
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